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BASING-POINT PRICING AND ANTITRUST POLICY
A RE-EXAMINATION of the legality under the antitrust acts of the wide-
spread practice of basing-point pricing is made appropriate by two recent
Supreme Court decisions.' Also, in view of a possible postwar resumption
of antitrust enforcement, a clear understanding of the system's economic
implications is needed so that a definite and consistent policy may be formu-
lated with regard to it.
I
Under a basing-point system goods are sold at delivered prices computed
by adding together the announced price at a basing point and the freight
I. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 324 U. S. 726 (1945); Federal
Trade Comm. v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U. S. 746 (1945). For a discussion of
these cases, see Aulette and Schaffer, Legality of the "Basing Point" Pricing System (1945)
33 GEO. L. J. 439.
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therefrom to the purchaser.2 When only one basing point is used, there
exists a "single basing-point system"; when prices are quoted on more than
one, there is a "multiple basing-point system." In the latter case the ap-
plicable basing point for a given sale is that at which the price combined with
the transportation factor results in a lower delivered quotation than could
be obtained by the use of any other base.3 Because there are almost in-
variably fewer basing points than points of production, many plants have
no base price at their location. 4 When these non-base units sell at prices
including transportation charges greater than those actually incurred,
"phantom freight" is collected.5 Conversely "freight absorption" is said to
occur when any producer sells to a consumer so located that the cost of ship-
ment exceeds the freight from the governing basing point. In neither in-
stance are cost and price directly related. A buyer located near a non-base
plant pays more on deliveries therefrom than a consumer who is farther
away from the point of actual shipment but nearer the basing point. Gen-
erally only railroad freight tariffs are employed in calculating delivered
quotations.7 Use of the system results in varying net returns for the seller,
2. 2 ENcYc. Soc. SCIENcES (1930) 473. For example if Chicago is the basing point,
and the Chicago price is fifty dollars, the delivered price will be the sum of fifty dollars plus
freight from Chicago to the purchaser.
3. Assuming that Chicago and Indianapolis are basing points for a commodity with
prevailing prices of fifty and forty dollars per unit respectively, then the delivered price for
a destination equidistant from both cities would be the Indianapolis figure of forty dollars
plus freight. Should, however, the consumer be so located that the freight from Indianapolis
is more than ten dollars in excess of that from Chicago, the sale would be based on Chicago
since a lower delivered price would be thereby obtained.
4. BuRxs, THE DECLINE OF CompETrrioN (1936) 336.
5. This would occur when a non-base producer basing his -ales on a Chicago basing
point sold to a consumer situated nearer to his plant than to the basing point; a fictional
item, the freight from Chicago would be included in the delivered price.
6. Freight would be absorbed were the consumer located nearer Chicago than to the
non-base producer selling on the Chicago base. Freight absorption may also occur on cales
by a basing-point producer. Under the fact situation set forth in note 3 supra an Indianapolis
seller would absorb freight when selling to a purchaser near Chicago.
7. Bums, op. cit. supra note 4, at 370. Railroad rates are stable and published. Their
use insures identical transportation charges for all sellers on any given sale. It is customary
in the steel industry to allow a seller who sends his own truck to the mill a credit equal to
65 per cent of the rail freight from mill to destination after including in the delivered price
the rail freight from the applicable basing point to destination. TNEC RPp., Tim B, uG
POurT PROBLEM, Monograph 42 (1941) The Basing Point M3tcIod of Quoting Ddcivrcd Prices
in the Steel Industry, 31, 73. Introduction of trucking in the cement industry caused pro-
ducers to take concerted action to discourage use of this mode of transportation. "The
primary reason for this activity . . . was the destructive effect of trucking upon the de-
livered price system." See Matter of the Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. 37, 191 (1943). An-
swers to a questionnaire sent to 117 mills in the course of a study sponsored by the Institute
and conducted from 1934 to 1937, showed that 85 mills permitted no trucldng, 3 imposed
penalties in the form of higher prices, and only 7 allowed trucking on the basis of the applica-
ble price f.o.b. mill without any restriction. Id. at 198. The existence of differential routes
in the Great Lakes and Warrior River areas caused a breakdown of the sugar industry's
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accordingly as phantom freight is collected or freight is absorbed, and also
results in uniform delivered prices by all firms using the same basing point
to any given purchaser, since all delivered figures are similarly calculated.8
This pricing device has manifested itself in a variety of industries 9 which
have certain similar characteristics. Generally the commodity is standard-
ized with a consequently elastic demand for,the output of any one producer, 10
transportation costs are high," and overhead costs important.' 2 Also, pro-
duction is often localized, being limited to a few geographic areas," and
transportation structure in the late 1920's, and caused combined activity by the refiner-
members of the Sugar Institute to maintain artificial freight charges considerably above
actual costs in the regions affected. See United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817,
843-56 (S. D. N. Y. 1934). See infra p. 566, at note 43.
8. See Clark, Basing Point Methods of Price Quoting (1938) 4 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF
ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 477, 479. So complete has been the uniformity in the
cement and steel industries that the purchasing agencies of the Federal Government have
been forced to award contracts by lot because of the submission of identical sealed bids by
competing firms. See FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssioN, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT WITH
RESPECT TO THE BASING-POINT SYSTEM IN THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY (1934) 5; Matter
of the Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. 87, 175-7 (1943); FEDERAL TRADE COMMIssION, PlucE
BASES INQUIRY (1932) 207-18.
9. The Federal Trade Commission reported, on the basis of material collected in 1928,
that the five industry groups with the highest percentage of firms quoting basing-point
prices were: iron, steel, and their products, except machinery, 26 per cent; stone, clay, and
glass products, 18 per cent; food and like products, 12 per cent; chemicals and allied prod-
ucts, 6 per cent; lumber and like products, 5 per cent. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
PRICE BASES INQUIRY (1932) 13.
The steel industry used a single basing-point system by which all prices were based on
Pittsburgh, until 1924, after which the multiple basing-point system now in use was adopted.
For a history of the practice in steel, see DAUGHERTY, DE CHAZEAU, STRATTON, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY (1937) 533-44. A description of the multiple
basing-point system used in the cement industry is set forth in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
PRICE BASES INQUIRY (1932) 23-26. Basing-point systems have been observed in the sale
of asphalt, hollow building tiles, nuts, bolts, range boilers, rivets, and sewer pipe. See
FETTER, TEE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931) 242. Other commodities sold at basing-
point prices include cast iron soil pipe, maple flooring, oak flooring, Philippine mahogany,
southern pine, plywood, benzol, carbon black, carbon tetrachloride, zinc, copper, and lead,
NELSON AND KErM, TNEC REP., PRICE BEHAVIOUR AND BUSINESS POLICY, Monograph 1
(1940) 282, 310, 320-1, 345. For examples of the use of basing-point systems in food indus.
tries, see Sugar Institute v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 817, 841-56 (S. D. N. Y. 1934);
Matter of Corn Products Refining Co. and Corn Products Sales Co., 34 F.T.C. 850, 859-61
(1942); Matter of United States Maltsters Ass'n, 35 F.T.C. 797, 809 (1942).
10. Clark, supra note 8, at 477. For a discussion of elasticity in the steel industry, see
TNEC REP., THE BASING POINT PROBLEM, Monograph 42 (1941), Some Factors in tho
Pricing of Steel, 11, 16.
11. Clark, loc. cit. supra note 10.
12. See Clark, supra note 8 at 478. For a discussion of overhead costs in the steel in-
dustry, see DAUGHERTY, DE CEAZEAU, STRATTON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 555-7.
13. MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION (1941) 176. The refining of sugar cane is confined
to the Atlantic seaboard, the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, and San Francisco. See Sugar
Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 572 (1936). Sixty-five per cent of the total output
of cast iron soil pipe is produced within 75 miles of Birmingham, Alabama. WiLCoX, TNEC
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frequently accompanied by a scattered demand.1 4 Lastly, there exists in
these industries a high concentration of volume in the hands of a few large
sellers and/or powerful trade organizations, 15 a fact which assumes major
significance in any analysis of the monopoly power of which a basing-point
system is both a tool and symptom."0
II
Since by this formula prices are often quoted with reference to a point
other than that of shipment and bear no necessary relation to actual costs,
basing-point pricing appears to be vulnerable under Section 2(a) of the
Clayton Act as amended by Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act.17 The
amended Section prohibits price discriminations ". . . where the effect of
such discriminations may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
REP., ComPaFroN AND MONOPOLY IN AmERICAN INDUSTRY, Monograph 21 (1940) 157.
The production of steel is likewise confined to a few geographic areas of which Pittsburgh is
the most important. De Chazeau, Public Policy and Discriminalry Prices of Stced (1933)
46 J. POL. EcoN., 537, 544. Cement production was originally highly concentrated in the
Lehigh Valley, although subsequently diffused. FEDERRL TRADE Cowenssio., Pfacn
BASES INQUIRY (1932) 31.
14. !7id. Demand for basic products, such as iron and steel, cement, sugar, lumber,
and metals is, of course, nationwide.
15. The fifteen members of the Sugar Institute controlled 70 to SO per cent of the do-
mestic refined sugar sold in the United States. See Sugar Institute v. United State,, 297
U. S. 553, 572 (1936). Five of the seventy-five members of the Cement Institute produce
over one-third of the industry's total capacity, and twenty-six of the members account for
three-fourths of the production. See ,Matter of the Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. S7, 142
(1943). The United States Steel Corporation and Bethlehem Steel Corporation controlled
in 1938, 49 per cent of the total ingot capacity, while nine companies controlled all but 13
per cent. AmERIc. N IRON AND STEEL INSrrrTE, IRoN AxD STEEL DiREctony O r T=l
UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1938) 401-2. Ten manufacturers produced all the corn
gluten in 1919. FEDERAL TRADE COsMISSION, REPOR ON CO1i!EnctAr FEEDS (1921) 162.
The twenty-four members of the Hardwood Institute produced, in 1938, 60 per cent of the
hardwood lumber produced in northern Wisconsin and northern Michigan. See Matter of
the Hardwood Institute, 34 F.T.C. 661, 663 (1942). Since 1929, nineteen companies have
manufactured over 65 per cent of all the malt produced in the United States. See Matter of
United States Maltsters Ass'n, 35 F.T.C. 797, 800 (1942). The members of the Cast Iron
Soil Pipe Association, thirty-five in all, produce over 90 per cent of the total output. WnLcox,
loc. cit. supra note 13.
16. See infra, pp. 571-3.
17. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1940), as amended by 49 STAT. 1526 (1936),
15 U. S. C. § 131 (1940). Proceedings instituted under this statute by the Federal Trade
Commission and resulting in orders to cease and desist basing-point pricing are: Matter of
the Corn Products Refining Co. and Corn Products Sales Co., 34 F.T.C. 850 (1942), aff'd,
324 U. S. 726 (1945); Matter of A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co. and the Staley Sales Corp.,
34 F.T.C. 1362 (1942), aft'd, 324 U. S. 746 (1945); TMatter of the Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C.
87 (1943), order based on § 2(a) as amended, and § 5 of Federal Trade Commiksion Act,
38 ST-AT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1940), petition for review filed with the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (July 26, 1943).
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benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them ... "
Permitted price differentials are those "which make only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery. . . ." In 1924, in a
proceeding under the original Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission
issued a cease and desist order condemning the single basing-point system
used by the United States Steel Corporation and its subsidiaries.18 Although
this "Pittsburgh Plus" decision was the administrative ruling in effect when
the Robinson-Patman Act was passed in 1936,19 a judicial interpretation of
the latter statute's applicability to this widely accepted system was only
recently forthcoming.
Thus, in Corn Products Refining Company v. Federal Trade Commission,20 a
decision handed down last April, the Supreme Court negated any possibility
that the basing-point device was impliedly exempt from the provisions of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The claim of the company that the legislative
history of the Act 21 indicated a congressional intent to sanction all such
systems was denied,22 but the Court, avoiding a blanket condemnation of
the system, concluded that the legality of any basing-point system had to be
determined by measuring each individual situation against the statute.
23
Nevertheless, the standards applied in the Corn Products case indicate
18. Matter of United States Steel Corporation, 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924). The Commission
held the respondents' pricing activities were also "unfair methods of competition" within
the meaning of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. at 58.
' The Corporation and its subsidiaries were ordered to cease and desist inter alla from
quoting or selling their rolled steel products at Pittsburgh Plus prices, or upon any other
basing point than that of manufacture or shipment. Id. at 59. Without admitting the
validity of the order of the jurisdiction of the Commission, the respondents filed an order of
compliance. See Mechem, The "Pittsburgh Plus" Case (1924) 10 A.B. A. J. 806, 809. On
May 18, 1938 a petition for review was filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.
See generally FETTER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 145-91; McLAUGHLIN, CASES ON Tn
FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS (1930) 253, n. 57; Commons, The Delivered Price Practice in the
Steel Market (1924) 14 Am. EcoN. REv. 505; Kreutzberg, The Passing of "Pittsburgh Pls"
(1924) 17 Ams. BANKERS ASS'N J. 301.
19. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 324 U.S. 726, 736 (1945).
20. 324 U. S. 726 (1945) aff'g 144 F. (2d) 211 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
21. When the Robinson-Patman bill was reported by the House Judiciary Committee,
an amendment was also submitted, to be inserted as subsection (5) of Section 2. This pro-
posed addition to the bill read:
"(5) That the word 'price', as used in this section 2, shall be construed to mean
the amount received by the vendor . . . after deducting actual freight or cost of
other transportation, if any, allowed or defrayed by the vendor."
H. R. RPP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) 2. The amendment was specifically de-
signed to abolish all basing-point pricing, and to require f.o.b. plant sales. Id. at 14. The
House, however, voted to strike it out. 80 CONG. REc. 8224 (1936). At the same session of
Congress the Wheeler Anti-Basing Point Bill was rejected. 80 CONG. REc. 8102, 8223,
8224 (1936).
22. 324 U. S. at 737. Compare concurring-dissenting opinion of Judge Major in A. E.
Staley Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 144 F. (2d) 221, 227-31 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
23. 324 U. S. at 737.
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how any basing-point system may be attacked under the amended section.
Although the company had plants both at Chicago and Kansas City, all
delivered prices for glucose were calculated with reference to the Chicago
base. 24 The Court, sustaining the Commission's cease and desist order,25
found that this system was discriminatory ". . . since the prices . . . upon
deliveries from Kansas City bear relation to factors other than actual
costs. . . . " The opinion thus indicates that price discriminations result
whenever phantom freight is collected or freight is absorbed, since, even
under a uniform delivered price, the difference between the actual trans-
portation cost and the freight rate from the basing point causes factory net
prices to vary according to the destination of the product and "in the amount
of this freight differential." 2 Moreover, in most cases the inference of a
probable adverse effect on competition-necessary to the establishment of
illegality under the statute-can be drawn from the mere fact of a basing-
point operation. For the Court sustained 23 the Commission's findings that
the result of the system's use was to lessen the ability of low-priced candy
manufacturers located at Kansas City and at other points far from Chicago
to compete with those near the basing point, and thus to create a favored
zone around Chicago.?
The companion decision in Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley
Manufacturing Company 0 makes it apparent that the requirements of the
amended section's rebuttal provision are not satisfied merely by proving
subsequent adoption of another's basing-point system. Section 2(b) pro-
vides that a producer may rebut the Commission's prima facie case by
showing "that his lower price . . . was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor." The Staley Company made an unsuc-
cessful attempt to take advantage of this provision by showing that in basing
sales on Chicago, although its only plant was at Decatur, Illinois, it had
merely accepted the basing-point formula of its Chicago competitors upon
subsequent entry into the glucose industry."' The Court pointed out that
24. Id. at 730.
25. See Matter of Corn Products Refining Co. and Corn Products Sales Co., 34 F. T. C.
850, 876-8 (1942).
26. 324 U. S. at 732.
27. Id. at 733.
2S. "The weight to be attributed to the facts proven or stipulated, and the inferences
to be drawn from them, are for the Commission to determine, not the courts." 324 U. S.
at 739.
29. Id. at 738-9. Thd Commission found that purchasers located in Kansas City paid
for deliveries from the local plant prices higher than a Chicago consumer would pay on
similar deliveries by the following percentages: August 1, 1936, 13 per cent; August 1, 1937,
12 per cent; August 1, 1938, 17 per cent; August 1, 1939, 19 per cent. As a rezult of theze
discriminations a number of candy manufacturers relocated in Chicago. Sce 'Matter of
Corn Products Refining Co. and Corn Products Sales Co., 34 F.T.C. 850, C61, 864 (1942).
30. 324 U. S. 746 (1945), rev'g 144 F. (2d) 221 (1944).
31. Id. at 751. The Staley Company had begun the manufacture of glucoze, or corn
syrup, in 1920. At that time two producers were selling the commodity in Chicago at baing-
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no proof had been offered that in each instance non-discriminatory prices
would be higher than those charged, 2 and that mere slavish adherence to the
discriminatory formula of another without any attempt to set up an inde-
pendent non-discriminatory system is not to act in "good faith" within the
statutory meaning.
33
Although indicative, neither of these cases can be construed as a judicial
condemnation of basing-point pricing per se. In holding the system not
exempt from the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court left
open the question as to its illegality in future cases.
III
In the absence of blanket approval or disapproval, the formulation of an
affirmative policy requires an analysis of the compatibility of the practice
with the ends of antitrust legislation. The principal objective is the securing
to the c6nsuming public, essentially by the fostering of price competition,
the benefits of a competitive economy, ultimately a maximum supply of
goods and services at lowest possible cost.
3 4
One of the most salient and, with regard to antitrust policy, one of the
most significant effects .of a basing-point system is a suppression of price
competition. Under basing-point distribution, the consumer, approached
point prices with Chicago as the single base. To share in the Chicago business the Staley
Company met the delivered prices of their rivals, making reductions where necessary, Id.
at 751. Judge Minton, delivering one of the two majority opinions, had accepted this argu-
ment as rebutting the Commission's prima facie case on the Company's appeal to the
Seventh Circuit. See A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 144 F. (2d) 221, 225
(C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
32. The Court stated: "The statutory test is whether respondents, by their basing point
system, adopted a 'lower price ... in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor.' This test presupposes that the person . . . would, by his normal, non-discrimlna-
tory pricing methods, have reached a price so high, that he could reduce it in order to meet
the competitor's equally low price .... Even though respondents, at many delivery points,
enjoyed freight advantages over their competitors, they did not avail of the opportunity to
charge lower delivered prices. Instead they maintained their own prices at the level of their
competitor's high prices . . . by including phantom freight in their own delivered prices.
... Moreover, there is no showing that if respondents had charged non-discriminatory
prices, they would be higher in all cases than those now prevailing under their basing point
system." 324 U. S. at 754-5.
33. ". . . [Tihey have slavishly followed . . . a pricing policy which, in their case,
resulted in systematic discriminations ... ." Id. at 755. "We cannot say that a seller acts
in good faith when it chooses to adopt such a clearly discriminatory pricing system, at least
where it has never attempted to set up a non-discriminatory system, giving to purchasers,
who have the natural advantage of proximity to its plant, the price advantages which they
are entitled to expect over purchasers at a distance." Id. at 757.
34. For a discussion of the goals of the antitrust legislation, see McAllister, Price Con-
trol by Law in the United States: A Survey (1937) 4 LAw & CoNTmiP. PROn. 273, 283, 285;
HODGES, ANTITRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1941) 4; Hamilton and Till, TNEC
REP., ANTITRUST IN ACTION, Monograph 16 (1941) 5; CLARK, THE FEDERAL TRUST PoLICY
(1931) cc. 3, 5; THORNTON, COMnINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE (1928) cc. 1, 2.
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with a united front, has no choice but to accept one of several identical bids.
Thus, whatever competitive pressure is felt must influence the setting of the
base price at the basing point. But even at this stage competitive incentive
is stifled. An isolated producer under a multiple basing-point system by
quoting a high base price at his plant does restrict the area for which his is
the governing base and in which he can sell without absorbing freight,5 and
he may invite penetration of the local market by distant sellers." But theze
considerations are offset by the fact that he can exact a large profit from
nearby customers with whom in all probability he has had previous dealings
and to whom he can offer prompt convenient service. Furthermore, should
this producer wish to sell to former customers now in an area governed by
another base, his larger profits in the home market permit absorption of
freight on a wide scale.rr Thus, a fundamental principle of basing-point
pricing is that a seller is permitted "to maintain a high price to buyers in the
vicinity of his mill without restricting his sales to the small territor: in which
his base price plus freight gives a lower delivered price than that calculated
by reference to any other base." 's For this reason, and also because long-
established bases could, by absorbing freight, still share the local market,
non-base units may have little short-run incentive to disturb the existing
price pattern by the establishment of lower base prices at their plants.0
35. Since a basing point is applicable for a given destination only vhen the sum of its
base price plus freight is lower than the delivered price similarly calculated on any other
base, the area governed by a basing point is expanded by a reduction in base price and con-
tracted by an increase. In this area the base seller realizes his greatest profit, at least equal
to base price. Selling in a region governed by another basing point involves meeting the
delivered price there by absorbing freight and realizing a lower plant net. Thu- any in-
crease in base price restricts the market territory in which the highest profit will be realizd.
36. Although an invasion by a distant producer nets that producer a smaller profit
than could be obtained in his own area, the profit that he does realize ,,ill be greatest
wherever the delivered price he must meet is greatest. Consequently a rise in baze price is
apt to attract competition from without the local territory.
37. Sales by freight absorption into another's market may cause reciprocal inva-sions,
either as a retaliatory measure, or as the natural result of loss of local business. Yet because
freight absorption allows additional sales without lowering base price, . . . Eellcrs are not
in fact much deterred by this prospect." Clark, Imnpcrfcd Competition Theory ora Basirng
Point Problems (1943) 33 Am. EcoN. REv. 283, 290.
38. BuRxs, Tan DECLINE OF COMIPE'ITION; (1936) 336. "Assuming rivalry of pro-
ducers under the basing point system, it is held that it reduces the incentive the seller has to
reduce the price charged to consumers in order to expand his sales or ward off encroachments
by his rivals, and instead puts him in a position in which it is very generally cheaper for him
to expand or protect his volume of sales by reaching out farther from his mill, absorbing
freight to a greater distance and accepting a lower mill yield on his additional sales ithout
cutting prices to a consumer. . . ." NATIONAL R\EcOVERY AD!NIsTRas TIOS, REronrT On
THE OPERPTION OF THE BA sING Pon-'r SYSTEM LN TE IRoN AND STErL ImsUrY (1934) 71.
39. The non-base producer who sells to local consumers at a price calculated by adding
to the base price full freight from the basing point may make a large profit on local mles,
and still be able to sell in other areas by the device of freight absorption. In effect the high
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Even where a number of sellers each quote basing-point prices and might
competitively establish a base price for the area, or under a single basing-
point system for the entire industry, there are two reasons why a seller may
not wish to quote a lower price than his rivals. The possibility of increasing
sales by freight absorption is always present, and also, if uniform delivered
prices are to prevail, a reduced figure will be instantly met, and no appreci-
able advantage will be gained.
4°
This suppression of direct price competition results in an increase of un-
necessary costs. Since all competition at the delivery point must be in sales-
manship, greater emphasis must be placed on advertising and other wasteful
forms of sales effort.4 ' The possibility afforded by the system of obtaining
orders in market areas governed by distant basing points, by meeting the
prevailing prices there, gives rise to cross-hauling, and to needlessly heavy
transportation costs for the industry as a whole. 42 Similarly costly is the
use of only railroad tariffs as the measure of freight charges while cheaper
routes are available. 43 Also inefficient or obsolete plants, shielded from direct
prices paid by local customers reimburse him for lesser profits realized when he absorbs
freight.
By establishing a base price he might get no more business because existing plants by
absorbing freight could enter the territory in which he could sell most cheaply. See BURNS,
op. cit. supra note 38, at 337-8.
40. Rigidity of price observed in the cement industry may serve as an example of the
minimization of incentive to lower base prices. With the exception of the period from
August to November, 1929, the twenty-two mills in the Lehigh Valley maintained their
prices "on a dead level" from January. 1927, to November, 1930. The same was true of tile
Hudson Valley mills except for from November, 1929, to November, 1930, they were ten
cents higher than prior to August, 1929. A similar condition was evidenced for the Buffing-
ton, Indiana, mills except that a ten cent drop during the last year of the period. Letter of
submittal by W. E. Humphrey, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, to the Congress,
reprinted in FEDERAL TRADE COMISSION, PRICE BASES INQUIRY (1932) XIII, XVI-XVII.
41. See Clark, Basing Point Methods of Price Quoting (1938) 4 CANADIAN JOURNAL o
ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 477, 483; MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION (1941) 184.
42. With regard to cross-hauling in the steel industry, Charles M. Schwab said, in an
address before the American Iron and Steel Institute in 1928, "It is manifestly uneconomic
for a steel manufacturer in Chicago to ship 100,000 tons of steel to Pittsburgh at a time
when a Pittsburgh manufacturer is shipping a like quantity of like material from Pittsburgh
to Chicago," and also that ". . . the net result of the cross-hauling of materials has not been
to increase the output of the individual producers by any appreciable amount. It has merely
served to dissipate a part of their profits in unnecessary transportation." FEDERAL TRADE
Co ImIssioN, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT WITH RESPECT TO THE BASING-POINT SYSTEM IN
TaE IRON AN STEEL INDUSTRY (1934) 13, 14.
The Commission has referred to cross-hauling as a "general symptom of failure of
competition." TNEC'REP., TnE BASING POINT PROBLEM, Monograph 42 (1941) Monopoly
and Competition in Steel, 1, 4. Professor J. M. Clark states, with regard to cross-hauling,
"The amount of the resulting waste cannot be exactly measured, but it is very substantial."
Clark, supra, note 41, at 482.
43. See note 7 supra. The seller may, of course, by using water transportation, for
example, cut the cost of some units, but the benefit of such a reduction is not passed on to
the consumer. See note 50 infra.
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price competition and able, by freight absorption, to sell in other markets,
may gain large profits on local sales and continue in existence much longer
than they could under effective price competition."
A further salient effect of the basing-point system is an artificial location
of industrial units-not only of the plants using the system but also of
consumer-producers. The collection of phantom freight by a non-base plant,
most flagrant aspect of the system's inherent geographic discrimination,
prevents the nearby consumer from realizing any advantage from location
(as expressed in price)," and arbitrarily increases costs for the buyer-
manufacturer in competition with others situated near a basing point." The
44. The Federal Trade Commission, after an investigation of pricing in the steel in-
dustry, reported, "The growing weakness and comparative inefficiency of older plants in
locations no longer best suited to the industry is bolstered up when they are ensured a con-
tinued outlet into large areas at delivered prices not to be undersold by any pre ant com-
petitors or by newer, better equipped, and more efficient plants." FEDERAL TILD Con-
MIsSION, PRACTICES OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY UNDER THE CODE (1934) 43. See also FEDrs AL
TRADE COMMSSION, PsucE BASES INQUIRY (1932) 142; TNEC REP., TME B,%snG POINT
PROBLEm, Monograph 42 (1941) Monopoly and Comptlilion in Sled, 1, 4. Uneconomic loca-
tion may be a factor in inefficiency. See note 4S in2fra.
45. A consumer located at or close to a basing point can purchase from any plant,
regardless of whether it is near or far, and he will only be required to pay a freight charge
equal to the cost of transporting the commodity from the nearby base. The consumer
situated far from the basing point may be able to purchase from a non-base plant clo-e at
hand, but he must pay the imaginary freight application. The only benefit he realizes is in
promptness of delivery and convenient service.
46. In the Pittsburgh Plus hearing the Federal Trade Commission found that the
Chicago fabricator, buying from a Chicago mill, paid $7.60 per ton more than his Pittsburgh
competitor. Similarly a manufacturer in Duluth paid on purchases from a Duluth mill
$13.20 more for steel than a Pittsburgh competitor. "At Milwaukee, a customer backs up
his truck to respondents' Milwaukee mill, hauls away the steel himself, but is obliged to pay
the imaginary freight charge from Pittsburgh...." See Matter of United States Steel
Corporation, S F.T.C. 1, 19-20 (1924).
Indeed two competitors, equidistant from a plant, might both purchase from that
plant, yet the customer to whose location the applicable freight rate is lower, receives a
gratuitous advantage not based on actual transportation costs.
As a result of this discrimination, competition among manufacturers or processors ucing
the product may be greatly lessened. For example, under the Pittsburgh Plus syztem, a
Chicago fabricator had to include in his total cost and consequently in his price, the imagNi-
nary freight charge from Pittsburgh to Chicago plus the actual cost of transporting the
finished product from Chicago to destination. By contrast the Pittsburgh fabricator had
only to pay the Pittsburgh price for steel plus the transportation cost of the finished product
from Pittsburgh to destination. Consequently the Chicago steel user was unable to compete
east of Chicago with Pittsburgh rivals. Indeed he could compete on an equal footing only
in that area where the freight rate from Pittsburgh was the same as the combined rate from
Pittsburgh to Chicago and from Chicago to destination. See Matter of United States Steel
Corporation, 8 F.T.C. 1, 21-22 (1924).
An analogous situation exists under the present multiple basing-point system in cteel
with regard to Pacific Coast fabricators who must pay phantom freight ranging from $10
to $13 per ton on steel produced locally but priced with reference to eastern bases. S e
TNEC REP., THE BASING Ponr PROBLEM, Monograph 42 (1941) An Aralysis of lh Basing-
Point System of Delivered Prices as Presented by United States Sled Corporation, 91, 112.
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ultimate result of having more centers of production than basing points is
frequently the location of processing and fabricating industries, not in rela-
tion to economic or geographic efficiency but near the established bases since
proximity decreases the price. 47 This increased demand at the basing points
may protect uneconomically-located or obsolete base units,4 while failure
of other vendor plants to quote independent prices can create local monopo-
lies in industries using the product. Indeed by agreeing to set base prices
only at designated points, the sellers of an important commodity such as
steel can determine what areas should be developed industrially. 49 Further-
more, the quotation of only railroad freight rates prevents any advantage
from accruing to a consumer-manufacturer situated on a cheaper alternate
47. See generally MILLER, op. cit supra note 41, at 182; BURNS, op. Cit. supra note 38,
at 345-52.
The single basing-point system of the Corn Products Company caused candy manu-
facturers to move their factories to Chicago. See note 28 supra.
With reference to steel, the Federal Trade Commission has stated, "It is not to be dis-
puted that the existing basing-point system tends to give competitive advantages to fabri-
cators who are located at basing points. This in turn gives certain advantages to producers
at basing points who become the natural sources of supply for the local fabricators." FED-
ERAL TRADE ComaIssIoN, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT WITH RESPECT TO TIHE BASING-POINT
SYSTEM IN THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY (1934) 25.
48. Costs of production may be lower at non-base plants because of natural advantages
or modern equipment, but if the consumers receive no benefit in the form of lower prices,
the consequent location of fabricators near the basing point will assure a ready market for
the base producer.
For example, the basing-point system in the steel industry has been defended on the
grounds that it affords protection to "property investment in a number of older centers
such as Pittsburgh and Youngstown, which might otherwise be at a serious disadvantage
in competition." Fly, The Sugar Institute Decisions and the Anti-trust Laws: iI (1936) 46
YALE L. J. 228, 233.
49. "It is evident . . . that the Pittsburgh basing-point system favored the establish.
ment of steel-using industries at Pittsburgh. . . . In so far as the practice was largely main-
tained by the United States Steel Corporation, the corporation was able to influence the
rate of development of steel-using industries in different parts of the country." BuRNS,
op. cit. supra note 38, at 349. With reference to the steel industry under the National Re-
covery Administration code of fair competition providing for a continuance of the practice,
the Federal Trade Commission contended that ". . . the power to select, discontinue, or
increase the number of basing points, involves the power of deciding what cities shall be
handicapped and what cities shall be built up as centers for the remanufacture and process-
ing of steel products." FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRACTICES OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY
UNDER THE CODE (1934) 20. See also Matter of United States Steel Corporation, 8 F.T.C. 1,
25-8 (1924).
Professor Fetter has contended with reference to the steel industry that "the basing-
point system arbitrarily changed the industrial map and continues uneconomically to
maintain it so, against the rights and interests of whole regions and of many individual citi.
zens." Fetter, The New Plea for Basing-Point Monopoly (1937) 45 J. PoL. Ecox. 577, 601.
For a discussion of recently expressed resentment among Pacific Coast industrialists at the
arbitrary freight differentials which are retarding the development of local steel and fabri-
ating industries, see FORTUNE, February, 1945, p. 130.
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route, 0 and increases the possibility of an industrial map radically different
from one that would result from true price competition.r1
Thus the basing-point system is incompatible with antitrust policy since
the suppression of price coipetition and concomitant wastes and artificial
location prevent any realization of the ultimate goal of lower prices for more
and better goods. Elimination of the practice should only be forestalled if
retention offers some appreciable positive advantage.
In defense of the system, its advocates point to the desirability of allowing
a seller to quote prices quickly and conveniently for any point, especially
where high transportation costs are an important element in the delivered
price, thus increasing the number of bids readily available to a purchaser
5 2
Secondly, the combination of a natural geographic concentration of produc-
tion combined with widespread demand is said to necessitate a formula
whereby a seller can compete in any market so as to insure stable operations
allowing him to achieve economies of scale-3 Thirdly, the claim is made that
where demand is highly elastic, and overhead costs must be met, this pricing
medium is valuable for it provides "a knowledge of the level at which com-
petition must be met . . . at a definite location" and prevents disorganized
markets.
54
These assertions do not seem to vindicate basing-point pricing. The pos-
sibility afforded to a seller to compete at any point may give the buyer a
wider range of choice, but still between identical bids; it does not secure to
him a lower price, and high transportation costs are arbitrarily assigned
among consumers.55 Furthermore it seems circular to assume that this
50. See note 43 supra. For a discussion of the effect of the all-rail formula on stedl
purchases located on vaterways and also the effect on the water transport industry, fse
FEDERAL TRADE CommissioN, PRACTICES OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY t'NDER THE Corn (1934)
27-32.
31. ... The natural disadvantages of unfavorably located producer. are removed
by what amounts to a subsidy collected from the buyers .... " FEDEnrL Tnwc Con-
MSSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT WITH RESPECT TO THE B, sLG-PoIN, SvsiTss n. T=n
IRON ND STEEL INDUSTRY (1934) 24.
52. See TNEC REP., TnE BASING POINT PROBLEM, Monograph 42 (1941) Some Factors
in the Pricing of Steel, 11, 25; MILLER, UNFAUR CouPEIvrrioN (1941) 176.
53. According to this line of irgument, the geographic concentration of production is
caused by natural factors. Producers of steel, for example, must build their plants where the
costs of assembling raw materials and of production are lowest. Also technical efficiency
necessitates production on a large scale. To operate a plant of optimum ize, outlet to the
market must be assured. The market for the product may be nationwide, however, and
furthermore, fluctuations in local demand may make the penetration of distant areas even
more imperative if production is to be maintained. Consequently there arises a need for
freight absorption and for a device allowing a producer to compete anywhere on equal terms
with the local sellers. See TNEC REP., TaE BASING POINT PROLEA, 'Monograph 42 (1941)
Some Factors in the Pricing of Steel, 11, 25. See also argument of Representative Citron in
defense of basing-point pricing in SO CoNG. R.Ec. 8224 (1936).
54. See TNEC REP., THE B.sING PonT PROBLE-s, 'Monograph 42 (1941) Some Factors
in the Pricing of Stee, 11, 25. See also BusINmss UEEx, May 5, 1945, p. 30.
55. A consumer located near a non-base plant, for example, may receive a number of
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pricing system is required by a natural maladjustment of production and
demand, since such maladjustment may be the result of basing-point pricing
and its effect on the location of industrial units. 51 Also, the advantages
gained by fostering the reaching into another's market in order to stabilize
economic rates of operation may be nugatory since these efforts by rival pro-
ducers prove mutually offsetting. 57 Finally any theoretical defense based
on the necessity of meeting overhead costs when demand elasticity is high
has little merit. Elastic demand merely indicates a potentially competitive
market, and it is through the impact of price competition on all costs in-
cluding overhead costs that the mechanical operation of economic forces
channels industrial investment so as to serve the consumer most advan-
tageously. 58 Suppressing price competition to allow sellers to cover fixed
costs is to subordinate public to private interest.
It must be admitted, however, that abolition of the system would cause
temporary hardships to some producers and to processing industries built up
in reliance on the present price pattern ;59 but the advantages to be gained
thereby far outweigh these considerations. Assuming the absence of collu-
sion to nullify the normal effects of demand elasticity, the substitution of a
uniform plant-net price policy would create vigorous price competition.
The possibility of absorbing freight being removed, a seller's market area
would be limited to that for which his plant price and actual transportation
costs combine to give a lower total delivered price than that of any other
producer. Sales could be increased and the tributary market territory ex-
panded only by reducing prices uniformly for all purchasers."0 Natural
bids from many firms. But all competition between them will be in service and salesmnan-
ship. The customer will still have to pay a delivered price equal to a sum of the base price
plus freight, although he may eventually decide to buy from the local plant. Similarly,
competition from without the area serves only indirectly to lower the base price there. See
note 36 supra. The system can work efficiently allowing uniform delivered quotations and
"competition" at any destination, only if there is a systematic and reciprocal variation in
plant nets, reflecting a systematic and reciprocal assignment of freight charges, without re-
gard to actual transportation costs. See Fly, Sugar Institute Decisions and the Anti-trust
Laws: II (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 228, 233.
56. See p. 567 supra.
57. See MILLER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 184.
58. See Wmcox, TNEC REP., COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY,
Monograph 21 (1940) 13.
59. "Industrial investment in steel mills and in consumer plants has been conditioned
by a basing-point system of prices for over thirty-five years. The f.o.b. mill plan would alter
arbitrarily the competitive advantage of location over a substantial portion of American
business." De Chazeau, Public Policy and Discriminatory Prices of Steel (1938) 46 J. POL.
EcqN. 537, 562.
For those candy manufacturers who relocated at Chicago in reliance on the single-
basing-point system used by corn products sellers, there would be obvious repercussions.
See note 28, supra.
60. Despite the absence of competition by distant sellers within the local territory, an
isolated producer would not have a monopoly position, since the extent of his market area
would be determined by competition at its boundaries. See Mund, The "Freight Allowed"
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geographic advantages would find expression in price differentials, wastes
would be eliminated, and costs decreased."1 Sanction of basing-point pricing
makes impossible this beneficial state of competition and resulting low prices.
IV
Despite the patent desirability of destroying the system, the amended
Clayton Act under present judicial interpretation may prove ineffective
as a legal weapon. The implications of the Corn Products and Staley cases
are admittedly sweeping, 2 and rigorous enforcement of Section 2(a) may
cause industries to make large-scale readjustments, since phantom freight
collections on an appreciable scale are clearly illegal and there will have to
be a basing point at or near each center of production. Yet it is not entirely
clear to what extent freight absorptions will escape the prohibitions of the
Act, as a meeting of lower prices in "good faith." C3
Moreover in a determination of the statute's adequacy the fact that the
effective maintenance of a basing-point system is a symptom of monopoly
must be considered. Although uniform prices may indicate perfect compe-
tition, the identical delivered prices accompanying the use of a basing-point
formula do not.6 4 They result from co6rdinated policy and action as to the
Ilethod of Price Quotaton (1939) 54 Q. J. Eco~. 232, 244. Compare TNEC Rn., Tim
BASING POIT PROBLEM, Monograph 42 (1941) The Basing-Point Melthd of Quoelig Dc-
livered Prices in the Steel Industry, 31, S1-S6.
61. See Mund, loc. cit. supra note 60. "With freight absorptions aloliAed, compati-
tion . . would almost certainly act vith more force to lower prices to consumer,-." NA-
TioNAL REcovERY ADmsNISTRATIoN, REPORT ON HE OPErATIOz OF Tim BASnG POII;T
SYSEM IN THE IRON AN STEEL IxNusrRY (1934) 162.
62. For comments on the significance to businessmen of these cases, Ece Clark, IV=
Basing Point Problenms (1945) 23 HAv. Bus. REv. 109; NEwswcns, May 7, 1945, p. 73;
Busnxss WEEEn, lay 5, 1945, p. 30.
63. The defense of meeting competition as a rebuttal of the Commis ion's prima facie
case is "a matter of evidence in each case, raising a question of fact as to whether the com-
petition justified the discrimination." Federal Trade Comm. v. A E. Staley ,Manufacturing
Co., 324 U. S. 746, 753 (1945). The determination of this question of fact is for the Com-
mission. Id. at 758.
Thus much will depend on the inferences dravm by the Commission in each instance.
Some freight absorption may be legal w-'hen a sellers factory price combined with actual
freight gives a higher total than a competitor's delivered price at that deStination. Id. at
757. But the widespread and systematic absorption of freight which allow a Eeller to main-
tain a high price to local consumers, and which gives rise to wnasteful interpenetration of
markets is hardly justifiable. As stated by Representative Utterbaci, during the enactment
of the Robinson-Patman bill, ". . . This procedural provision cannot be construed as a
carte blanche exemption to violate the bill . . . so long as that competition cannot be met
without the use of oppressive discriminations in violation of the obvious intent of the bill."
SO CONG. Rxc. 9418 (1936).
6. The very mechanics of the system serve to suppress competition with rempsct to
price, and cause wastes, artificial location, and a higher price level. Theze effects are ju:.t
the opposite from what is to be expected under perfect competition. See pp. 564 supra.
That ". . . the thesis that a policy of identical prices according to a formula can be
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method of price quoting by sellers controlling the bulk of production. To
the extent that by acting in concert these sellers are enabled to impose a
discriminatory system on the public and to maintain high prices by re-
stricting the supply in any area to what will be accepted at the prevailing
price, they possess and exercise an'appreciable degree of monopoly power."5
Such united action may possibly be achieved by "tacit understanding" or
acceptance of a "business custom," or more probably by collusion." Agree-
me~ats to use the system have been evidenced in several instances, effected
by the members of powerful trade associations."7 Combination and the
intimidation of independents Is is facilitated in basing-point industries by
the presence of these trade groups and also by the frequently observed con-
followed without collusion, agreement, or understanding is misconceived ...", see Mund,
Monopolistic Competition Theory and Public Price Policy (1942) 32 Azi. EcoN. REV. 727,
733. Identical delivered prices which result from systematic price discrimination hardly
indicate eompetition, since such discriminations are impossible under free competition.
See Viner, Objective Tests of Competitive Price (1925) 33 J. POL. EcoN. 107, 110. Furthermore
the presence of sellers refusing to use their plants as a base for sales in the local area "is
seldom or never found in a competitive industry." Fly, supra note 55 at 237.
The Federal Trade Commission considered the Pittsburgh Plus system evidence in
itself that free competition did not exist. See Matter of United States Steel Corporation,
8 F.T.C. 1, 40-1 (1924).
65. "If the market supply is in large measure controlled either by one seller or by a
group which acts more or less as one on price, there is present an element of monopoly."
Mund, supra note 64, at 738. ". . . Monopoly may be said to exist whenever a single seller
or a number of sellers acting in unison control enough of the supply . . .to enable them to
augment their profit by limiting output and raising price." WiLcox, TNEC RxP., Comm-
TITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERicAN INDUSTRY, Monograph 21 (1941) 10.
66. The pricing of many commodities involves quantity discounts, "extras", and other
factors which are taken into account when setting the price. The uniformity of policy with
respect to the inclusion of these items necessary to identical prices would be difficult to
obtain in all probability without some understanding. The same may be said with regard
to the treatment of other-than-rail transportation.
"Where firms agree upon a common basing point, each one, foregoing the competitive
advantage inherent in its location, makes its delivery charge so high as to enable every other
one, however distant, to sell in territory that would otherwise belong to it alone. Without
collusion, no such practice could obtain." WILcox, op. cit. supra note 65, at 146.
67. The collusive use of basing-point systems pursuant to agreements for the mainte-
nance of uniform prices has been condemned as an unfair method of competition within the
meaning of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in the following hearings: Matter of
United States Maltsters Ass'n, 35 F.T.C. 797 (1942), second petition for review filed with
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (February 26, 1943); Matter of the Hard-
wood Institute, 34 F.T.C. 661 (1942); Matter of Pine Hill Lime & Stone Co., 33 F.T.C.
427 (1941); Matter of North Dakota Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, 9 F.T.C. 266 (1925).
The multiple basing-point system in the cement industry was also maintained by combi-
nation among the members of the Cement Institute. See Matter of Cement Institute,
37 F.T.C. 87 (1943). See also United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, 851 (1934).
68. Powerful firms in the cement industry have dealt with rebellious producers by
putting into effect at their plants punitive base prices, frequently lower than the base prices
of the sellers imposing them. See Matter of the Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. 87, 178-87
(1943).
[Vol, 55: 558
1946] BASING-POINT PRICING AND ANTITRUST POLICY 573
centration of volume in a few producers. Behind a utilization of the system
may be the desire to suppress price competition, to collect large profits in
the home market, or to share in a harmonious "open competition" plan.
The system has obvious value as part of a scheme to protect invested capital
at certain locations or to fix the level of prices. Abolition of the device by
Robinson-Patman Act enforcement can remove in the particular instance
the formula allowing such coordinated actionP Nevertheless, however
effective a cease and desist order may be in preventing sellers from using the
system, the concentration of volume and the existence of trade groups make
other forms of future agreements or understandings as to price quite likely,
and the imposition of a competitive price structure may indeed stimulate
such concerted action.
Where combination in conjunction with producers' associations has made
possible the maintenance of a basing-point system, the Clayton Act appears
to be an inadequate remedy and dissolution of the organization by Sherman
Act 70 proceedings may be necessary to insure a restoration of competition.
To date, however, in Sherman Act cases, basing-point systems have been
considered only as one of a number of activities allegedly in restraint of
trade. For this reason the failure of the Supreme Court to find any "pro-
hibited concert of activity" 71 in M1aple Flooring Manufacturers Association
v. United States 72 and Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. United
States 7, offers little guidance in the determination of the legal status of the
practice. Furthermore, in the former case, it vs carefully pointed out that
although the mills quoted delivered prices by adding the freight tariff from
the single basing point at Cadillac, Michigan to their base prices, they sold
69. "Although sellers may still 'act as one' . .. the likelihood of such action would La
reduced and the problem of coping with any residuum of monopoly would be reduced."
Mund, loc. cit. supra note 60. See also Fetter, The New Pica for Basing Point Monopd:y
(1937) 45 J. PoL. EcoN. 577,591.
70. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1.
71. Chief Justice Stone, who delivered the opinions in the Maple Flooring and Cement
cases, in distinguishing them from the Corn Products case, stated, "The only question for
decision in those cases was whether there was a concerted price-fixing scheme among com-
peting sellers, accomplished in part by their adoption of a uniform basing-point system;
in fact, no prohibited concert of action was found." Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal
Trade Comm. 324 U. S. 726, 735 (1945).
For an interesting comment on these cases, see FETTEn, TnE A'QuEnrADE or Mo-
NoroLy (1931) 231-42.
72. 268 U. S. 563 (1925). The activities of the Association complained of by the gov-
ernment were: the calculation and distribution to members of the average cost of all dimen-
sions and grades of flooring, the distribution of a booklet containing freight rate3 from the
basing point, the gathering and dissemination of sales statistics, and meetings of memlbrG'
representatives at which the industry was discussed. Id. at 566-7.
73. 268 U. S. 388 (1925). In the Cement case the government attached the usu, of
"specific job contracts," the compilation and distribution of freight rates from the basing
points, the exchange of information concerning credits, and the activities of the Aszociation
at meetings. Id. at 592.
THE YALE LA W JO URNAL
f.o.b. mill on request, 4 and that no substantial uniformity in delivered prices
had been evidenced.75 Such uniformity was found, however, in the Cement
case, accompanying the use of a multiple basing-point system.7 Warning
that "agreements or understanding among competitors for the maintenance
of uniform prices are of course unlawful," 77 the Court concluded, however,
that the identical quotations were the result of competition."
Collusive maintenance of a basing-point system was condemned in United
States v. Sugar Institute.79 The defendant refiners in that case concertedly
maintained a delivered price system, setting arbitrary transportation charges
higher than those dictated by actual costs 8 0 and refusing to sell f.o.b. re-
finery 8 l The Court, enjoining the members of the Institute inter alia from
collectively "determining transportation charges or freight applications," 82
stated that, "in thus concertedly fixing a substantial element in the price of
sugar without any demonstration or even real consideration of the reason-
ableness of the charge, . . . defendants acted . . . illegally." 83
Under this reasoning, any agreement to use a basing-point system would
be unlawful as an agreement to fix a part of the delivered price since the pre-
determined freight rates employed are usually higher than necessary, owing
to the collection of phantom freight and the quoting of all-rail tariffs, and
consequently "unreasonable." Thus concerted action in maintaining a
basing-point system is a type of price-fixing.8 4 Even assuming competitively
,established base prices, uniform delivered figures accompanying the use of
74. 268 U. S. at 571. "But if, as appears probable, the f.o.b. price was computed by
first calculating the delivered price based on Cadillac and then deducting the actual freight
charge from the point of production to the point of delivery, the buyer gained nothing from
the use of the mill price." BuRNs, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936) 292. This custom
of quoting f.o.b. mill prices by deducting actual freight from the formula-calculated price
has been followed by cement sellers in sales to the Federal Government. See Matter of the
Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. 87, 167 (1943).
75. -Id. at 567.
76. 268 U. S. at 593.
77. Id. at 604.
78. Id. at 605-6.
79. 15 F. Supp. 817 (S. D. N. Y. 1934). On appeal the decree was modified in other re-
spects, and affirmed as modified, 297 U. S. 553 (1935). That part of the lower court's decree
regarding the determination of transportation charges was not challenged on appeal.
The petition for dissolution, attacking a variety of activities on the part of the refiners,
,charged "a comprehensive conspiracy affecting almost all phases of the sale and distribu-
tion . . . of domestic refined cane sugar." 15 F. Supp. at 822.
80. 15 F. Supp. at 849-50.
81. Id. at 849.
82. The decree also forbade collective action in "selling only on delivered prices . . .
-or refusing to sell f.o.b. refinery." Id. at 908.
83. Id. at 903.
84. Concerted price-fixing is illegal per se. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U. S. 392, 397-8 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 220-4
(1940). "Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful
activity." 310 U. S. at 221.
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the system would be impossible without identical, automatically-fixed trans-
portation charges. Therefore, if agreements for uniform price maintenance
are prohibited, 5 an understanding to adopt a formula which leads to arti-
ficially identical delivered prices should be similarly condemned.
Furthermore, since all freight-absorbing sales involve the acceptance of
prices set by rivals, once identical freight charges are established, only a
collusive setting of base figures is needed to give producers complete control
over the price level. Thus, in practice, an agreement to use a basing-point
system is a constant menace to competition and the resultant best interest
of the consuming public.
Whether or not dissolution is required in a given case, the interests of the
consuming public can be protected and a desirable industrial decentraliza-
tion achieved only if the eradication of basing-point pricing is a primary
objective of post-war economic policy. To assure the benefits of competi-
tion, rigorous enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act will be necessary,
and also close co6peration between the Federal Trade Commission and the
Justice Department with a view to the most effective possible use of the
Sherman Act.
85. See p. 574 supra at note 77.
